Fees agreed in the final hours of a transfer window tend to exceed what the same players commanded weeks earlier. The cause is the deadline itself rather than a late surge in demand.
The deadline destroys the option to wait
Through most of a window, either side can walk away and resume talks later. That possibility is what restrains price.
As the deadline approaches, walking away stops meaning delay and starts meaning failure. A buyer who does not agree terms has an unfilled position for months.
Removing the option to wait removes the main source of a buyer's leverage, and sellers price accordingly.
Selling clubs face the reverse problem
A club that has agreed to sell must complete before it can replace the departing player. Failure leaves it holding an unsettled squad member who wanted to leave.
Late in a window that pressure can flip, and a seller may accept less than it demanded earlier to avoid being left with the situation.
Which side the pressure falls on depends on who has more to lose from no deal, and that is rarely the same for both.
Chains make everything conditional
A signing frequently depends on a departure, which depends on another club's decision elsewhere. Each link introduces a point of failure.
The final club in a chain has the least time to react and the fewest alternatives, which is why the smallest clubs in a sequence often pay most in relative terms.
Chains also explain the sudden clustering of deals in the last hours, since one resolution releases several others.
Loans absorb the pressure
A loan with an option to buy defers the valuation question rather than answering it. Both sides can agree to a deal without agreeing on a price.
The volume of late loans reflects this, because they are the only structure that can be assembled quickly when a permanent fee cannot be settled.
Obligations triggered by appearances then convert the loan into a purchase without either club having negotiated in a rush.
Late business tends to underperform
Deals struck under time pressure receive less medical scrutiny, less tactical assessment and less contract negotiation than planned ones.
Clubs with strong recruitment structures deliberately complete business early, accepting a slightly higher headline price for a much better process.
The premium visible on deadline day is therefore partly a price for haste and partly a price for the shortcuts that haste requires.